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Abstract 
We argue that pity can motivate collective action intentions toward groups that are both 
politically and economically deprived. We tested this connection in four online surveys and 
an experiment. In Study 1 (N = 1007), pity for the Roma in Hungary predicted collective 
action intentions, which was replicated in Study 2 in connection with refugees in Germany (N 
= 191) and in Hungary (N = 563). Study 3 (N = 475) demonstrated that for not economically 
but politically disadvantaged groups (e. g., sexual minorities), pity was not a predictor of ally 
action. In an experiment (Study 4, N = 447), pity was just as strong predictor of collective 
action intentions as outrage on behalf of an economically and politically disadvantaged 
outgroup. Pity can be a mobilizing emotion when it comes to groups that are both 
economically and politically disadvantaged, however, outrage remains more important in the 
absence of economic hardships. 
Keywords: pity, ally collective action, donation, economic disadvantage 
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Pity for economically disadvantaged groups motivates donation and ally collective action 
intentions  
 
“Don’t feel sorry for refugees—believe in them” (Mufleh, 2017); "Refugees don’t 
need your pity.” (Badkhen, 2016); "Integrate refugees with help, not pity” (De Gruyter, 2016). 
These headlines suggest that feeling pity for someone is a problematic, paternalistic emotion 
that may stand in the way of effective action. However, philosophers (Konstan, 2015) and 
social psychologists alike have been interested in the nature of pity as an ambivalent emotion 
(Lunardo, & Bezençon, 2015) without offering a clear-cut answer to the question whether pity 
is a useful (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger,1999) or a harmful emotion (Leach, Snider & 
Iyer, 2002; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009). So far, there is only limited evidence that pity 
can help efforts to reduce socio-economic and political disadvantage. Therefore, we ask 
whether pity for a disadvantaged outgroup can motivate solidarity-based collective action by 
advantaged group members. 
Forms and Targets of Supportive Behavior 
Ally collective action is conducted in political solidarity with another group (Becker, 
2012). Collective action usually refers to activism in the form of political protests, such as 
signing petitions or participating in demonstrations with the goal of social change (van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Such forms of 
action may help overturn inequality and produce long-term change, therefore we also refer to 
them as political action (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Thomas & McGarty, 2018, refer to 
this as activist support; Van de Vyver & Abrams (2017) refer to this as justice relevant 
prosocial action). In contrast, intergroup helping or donation is a form of support with little 
social change potential that may even contribute to maintaining the status quo (see e.g. 
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Nadler, 2002; Thomas & McGarty, 2018, refer to this as benevolent support; Van de Vyver & 
Abrams, 2017, refer to this as benevolence relevant prosocial action). Studies of ally 
collective action mainly focus on activism on behalf of groups that are targets of prejudice, 
discrimination, and (political) threats but do not necessarily face disadvantage in economic 
terms (for example sexual minorities in Western countries, who are diverse in socio-economic 
status [SES]). In contrast, studies of volunteerism focus on economic rather than political 
(civic, or human rights) disadvantages (e.g. the poor, homeless people, and victims of 
humanitarian crises, Kende, 2016; Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012).  
We focus on groups that suffer both economic deprivation (such as a lower SES, lack 
of resources, poor housing and health conditions), and political disadvantages (such as 
violation of their rights, discrimination, and lack of respect). Such groups tend to be perceived 
as vulnerable, in need of help and dependent of care. They tend to evoke prosocial emotions 
in members of advantaged groups, such as sympathy or pity that motivate supportive behavior 
(Alphen, Dijker, Bos, van den Borne, & Curfs, 2011). Advantaged group members can show 
support for such groups either by fulfilling their material needs by donations, volunteerism, 
and charitable acts or by engaging in political action as allies to gain political recognition, 
fight injustices, and achieve change in the intergroup status quo (Marullo, & Edwards, 2000; 
Radke, Kutlaca, Siem, Wright, & Becker, in press). In this context, the distinction between 
prosocial emotions and outrage, and between benevolent and activist support (Thomas & 
McGarty, 2018) is blurred because motivations of alleviating the suffering of the 
disadvantaged group and fighting the structural injustice can co-exist (Becker, Ksenofontov, 
Siem, & Love, 2018; Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba, & Lukács, 2017).  
Intergroup Emotions toward the Disadvantaged 
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In response to perceived injustice, intergroup emotions have a regulatory function of 
intergroup behavior, that is, specific action tendencies are linked to the experience of different 
specific emotion (Halperin, 2014; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). Groups elicit different 
intergroup emotions depending on the type of disadvantage they suffer which can lead to 
different behavioral intentions toward them. On the one hand, perceived intergroup injustice 
toward politically disadvantaged groups (e.g. the violation of human rights) typically elicits 
anger (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Montada & Schneider, 1989) or outrage (Leach et 
al., 2002; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). Outrage is a politicized emotion in response to the 
violation of moral convictions (van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011), therefore it 
fosters collective action (Thomas & McGarty, 2009).  
Injustice appraisals can not only stem from perceived grievances of political 
oppression, but can be responses to the needs and deprivation of economically disadvantaged 
groups, which usually lead to prosocial emotions of empathy, sympathy or pity, typically 
eliciting prosocial behavior, such as helping (see the BIAS map, Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 
2007). We propose to go beyond the dichotomy of outrage and collective action, versus 
prosocial emotion and intergroup helping link, and suggest that the prosocial emotion of pity 
might be just as genuine and adequate emotional response when it comes to outgroups that 
suffer from  both economic and political hardships, hence a predictor of collective action 
similarly to outrage. 
Pity as a “Good Enough” Emotion on behalf of the Economically Deprived 
Pity is an other-focused emotion in response to the perceived distress of someone in 
need. It is a negative emotional state, a result of a downward comparison which reflects a 
status difference between the self and the other (Smith, 2000). Pity, similarly to other 
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prosocial emotions, like sympathy or compassion can be connected to an increased arousal in 
response to the suffering of others.  The more serious the perceived disadvantage is, the more 
likely advantaged group members experience prosocial emotions (Dijker & Koomen, 2010). 
According to the stereotype-content model, outgroups considered high in warmth, but low in 
competence (as a result of perceived vulnerability) tend to evoke the emotional response of 
pity (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2007). In line with this, the theory of vulnerability-based 
morality suggests that groups in need induce higher vulnerability appraisals based on specific 
cues, inducing moral emotions, such as sympathy. Such emotions usually lead to an 
evolutionary care mechanism to support the group by any possible means (Dijker, 2014).  
Our goal in the present paper was to compare the prosocial emotion of pity to outrage 
in their potential to predict collective action on behalf of groups with different types of 
disadvantages. In many previous studies about the implications of prosocial emotions on 
intergroup behavior, pity, sympathy, and empathy were used interchangeably (e.g. Boler, 
1997; Wispé, 1986), which makes it hard to disentangle the functions of each emotions. In our 
theorizing, pity is different from empathy, as pity is related to a clear distinction between the 
self and the other, while empathy is a result of an identification with the other (Thomas et al., 
2009). It is even more challenging to disentangle pity from sympathy. Leach and colleagues 
(2002) proposed that sympathy is a result of the appraisal of the intergroup situation as 
illegitimate and stable, while pity is based on the appraisal of legitimate and stable situation 
without much prospect for social change. In contrast, outrage has been identified as the 
strongest mobilizing emotion, as it is an emotional response to an illegitimate and unstable 
situation. We argue that indeed pity comes as a response to a stable status difference, but we 
question the assumption that pity is related to the legitimization of the status difference, and 
therefore unrelated to social change motivations.  
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Nevertheless, we differentiated between pity and sympathy, as the latter involves a 
dual focus and perceived similarity of the self and the other. For example, sympathy includes 
pity for the other’s suffering and a worry if one can avoid a similar situation (Smith, 2000). 
Pity, in contrast, is a clearly other-focused emotion, when someone feels sorrow about the 
misfortune of others (Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1986), therefore we found it a relevant emotion 
in connection with economically marginalized outgroups from the perspective of advantaged 
participants. 
Pity and Behavioural Intentions 
Pity can lead to action for both egoistic and altruistic reasons. When pity is connected 
to an increased arousal that people aim to reduce by alleviating the suffering of others (Dijker, 
2001; Wispé, 1991), this can be understood as a self-focused or egoistic motivation. In 
contrast, according to the Batsonian view, “empathic concern” motivates altruistic behavior 
without egoism (Batson, 2010; Batson, & Ahmad, 2009). In this sense emphatic concern does 
not require identification with the other (in contrast to other, abovementioned interpretation of 
empathy). The perception of others’ needs leads to the impetus to act (Batson, Ahmad, & 
Stocks, 2004), in line with our conceptualization of pity. 
Florian, Mikulincer, and Hirschberger (1999) explored three different facets of pity 
from the perspective of focus and action: self- other and double- focus. Self-focus and double 
focus (on self and the other) had negative consequences for behavioral outcomes (e.g. 
avoidance) whereas pity with other- focus was related to altruistic attitudes and behavior. 
Another study differentiated between altruistic (selfless) and cynical (self-focused) pity, 
highlighting that focus on the other (and not on the self) is linked to altruistic behavior 
(Lunardo, & Bezençon, 2015). This evidence suggests that pity can involve an other-oriented, 
altruistic component.  
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We propose that when economic deprivation of a group is inevitable, pity is an 
adequate, “good enough” intergroup emotion by higher status group members in terms of 
mobilizing them for supportive action. As with other prosocial emotions, such as sympathy 
that has been linked to collective action, pity is also a possible predictor not only of donations, 
but also political action on behalf of economically and politically marginalized groups (e.g. 
poor people or refugees). In contrast, in relation to politically disadvantaged groups (e.g. 
sexual minorities), in the absence of economic hardships, and with a smaller status difference 
between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, pity is less adequate and less tailored to the 
needs of these groups, and therefore a more paternalistic emotional response. However, 
previous studies hardly investigated the possible role of pity in collective action. Besides the 
role of anger and outrage, only sympathy and empathy were identified as antecedents of 
collective action (Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Leach 
et al., 2002; Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015). 
Hypotheses 
We expect that the presence or absence of economic disadvantage influence the 
perception, emotion and action intention of potential allies. Our question is whether pity can 
be a mobilizing emotional response for ally collective action on behalf of economically 
disadvantaged outgroups,. We assume that these groups will be perceived to be vulnerable 
based on their economic deprivation, and they induce genuine prosocial emotions that can 
motivate ally behaviors both in the form of donation and collective action.  
1. Injustice awareness about economically and politically marginalized groups would 
have an indirect effect via both outrage and pity on behavioural intentions. 
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2. We expected that pity- similarly to outrage- would predict both donation and 
collective action intentions on behalf of groups that are both economically and 
politically disadvantaged. 
3. Pity would be a weaker predictor compared to outrage of collective action intention 
on behalf of groups that are politically disadvantaged, but economically not 
deprived. 
In sum, disadvantage type (economic/political versus only political) would moderate the 
effect of pity on collective action intention, with a similar effect of pity and outrage on 
collective action intention where considering combined economic and political disadvantage, 
and a smaller effect of pity compared to outrage in response to political disadvantage. For a 
visual demonstration of our predictions, see Figure 1. 
Overview of the Studies 
We conducted a survey in Hungary related to the Roma minority (Study 1) and 
replicated our findings in connection with refugees in Germany (Study 2a), and in Hungary 
(Study 2b). We tested our predictions with the politically disadvantaged, but economically not 
deprived gay group in Hungary (Study 3). Finally, we conducted an experiment in which we 
compared the role of pity in ally collective action on behalf of an economically and politically 
versus a politically disadvantaged fictitious group (Study 4). 
Study 1 
Roma people constitute the largest ethnic minority group in Hungary (Council of 
Europe, 2012). They are targets of discrimination, affected by poverty and unemployment and 
subject to demographic and institutional segregation (Farkas, 2014; Feischmidt, Szombati, & 
Szuhay, 2013). Anti-Roma prejudice is widespread and often blatantly expressed (Kende, 
Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017). In this context, positive attitudes and engagement in pro-social 
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action is counter-normative and highly politicized. Because of the structural disadvantages of 
the Roma, allies are important in fulfilling the group’s material needs and participating in 
their political struggles.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. We conducted an online survey in 2016 as part of an 
omnibus research in Hungary (N = 1007). Participants were recruited by a survey company 
that offered a raffle price for participation. We used a multi-step, proportionally stratified 
sampling method of an online participant pool resulting in a sample demographically similar 
to the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, and type of settlement, however they 
were somewhat higher educated than average. N = 1000 is typically used in opinion poll 
surveys relying on representative samples of Hungarian society (see Poll of polls, 2018). The 
language of the questionnaire was Hungarian. Based on the outlier analysis of SPSS, we had 
no outliers or extreme responses from the mean of either of the variables used in the path 
model.1 
Fifty-one percent of participants were women, mean age was 41.5 (SD = 13) years; 
39% had a higher education degree, 46.1 % finished secondary school, 2.9% did not finish 
secondary school and 11.6 % chose "other” option; 19% lived in Budapest, 54% in smaller 
towns, and 27% in a village. 
We conducted all the statistical analysis using IBM SPSS version 22.0 and AMOS 
(Arbuckle, 2011). We report all measures and data exclusions related to the research question. 
We conducted the studies with the IRB approval of anonymous University. The manuscript 
adheres to ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well as author's 
 
1 We used a boxplot which indicates interquartile range (IQR) computed from Tukey’s hinges. Values between 1.5 and 3 IQR 
from the end of the box indicates outliers, and over 3 IQR indicates extreme responses. 
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national ethics guidelines. Data accessibility will be ensured in a repository of the osf.io 
website. 2 
Measures. We used brief self-report measures on appraisals, emotions and action 
intentions. In all measures 7-point Likert type- scales were used (from 1 = completely 
disagree to 7 = completely agree), unless otherwise indicated. The list of all items are 
presented in Appendix A. Injustice awareness was measured by two items.3 Emotions were 
measured by single items in the following way: “If you think of the situation of Roma in 
Hungary, to what extent do you feel…? Pity; Outrage” (we translated the Hungarian word 
“sajnálat” as pity throughout). Donation intentions were measured by two items and collective 
action by four items.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics. Injustice awareness, pity, outrage, donation intentions and 
collective action intentions were low suggesting overall negative attitudes toward the Roma. 
All the variables were correlated with a medium to large effect size, except for the correlation 
between outrage and donation intentions that was nonsignificant. For scale reliabilities, means 
and correlations between variables, see Table 1. 
Hypothesis Testing. To test the connection between injustice awareness, emotions, 
and behavioral intentions, we used path analysis, which is an extension of multiple linear 
regression allowing the test of indirect or mediated effects (Streiner, 2006), enabling us to test 
 
2 The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article. 
3 A limitation to this measure is that injustice perception is not explicit in these items, only a perception of outgroup 
disadvantage. However, in the hostile intergroup context in which the study was conducted where the majority of the 
population shows blatant prejudice, we expected that the acknowledgement of outgroup disadvantage inherently expresses 
injustice appraisal, therefore we handled this measure as equivalent to the injustice awareness measures of the other studies, 
and they functioned very similarly indeed. 
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our hypothesized linear model. We did not rely on latent variable models, because each 
construct was measured by a single scale or item.  
We worked with the assumption that all variables would be associated, however, we 
expected that their connections would have different magnitude. We applied the model 
building – model trimming technique (see e.g. Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005), with a 
Maximum Likelihood estimation method. We first built a saturated model and trimmed (or 
erased) non-significant paths to build a model that reflects our data in the most parsimonious 
way. We conducted data imputation to substitute missing values for the mediation analysis, so 
we tested if pity and outrage function as mediators between injustice awareness and 
behavioural intentions. 
Additionally, we conducted a direct comparison between the outrage - collective 
action intentions path and the pity — collective action intentions path, to test if there is a 
significant difference between the emotions as predictors. In addition, to test the special 
importance of the path between pity and collective action, we erased this path with the 
expectation that model fit would deteriorate.  
The path between outrage and donation intention was not significant in the first model 
(B = -.04; SE = 0.03; p = .105; β = −.05), and therefore removed. The trimmed model showed 
good fit to our data (see Table 3). Injustice awareness more strongly predicted pity (B = 0.55; 
SE = .03; p < .001; β = .54) than outrage (B =.27; SE = .03; p < .001; β = .25). Injustice 
awareness was directly connected to both collective action intentions (B =.29; SE = 0.02; p < 
.001; β = .36) and donation intentions (B = 0.26; SE = 0.03; p < .001; β = .26). Pity was even 
stronger (B = 0.23; SE = 0.03; p < .001; β = .28) predictor of collective action than outrage (B 
= 0.09; SE = 0.02; p < .001; β = .12). Donation intention was predicted only by pity (B = 0.39; 
SE =.03; p < .001; β = .40). Pity and outrage had a positive connection (β = .34; p < .001); and 
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collective action intentions and donation intentions, too (β = .48; p < .001). For a visual 
presentation of our results, see Figure 2. 
To reveal whether intergroup emotions would convey an indirect effect of injustice 
awareness on donation and collective action intentions, a mediation analysis was conducted 
with the bootstrapping technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where we 
requested 95% confidence intervals using 2000 re-samples. We found that both pity and 
outrage were significant mediators between injustice awareness and collective action 
intentions. For the results of the mediation analysis, see Table 2. 
The path between outrage and collective action intention was significantly weaker than 
between pity and collective action intention (t = 4.41, df = 2, p < .001). When we removed the 
path between pity and collective action intention, model fit indices were worsened 
significantly (for fit indices of the original model and without the path between feeling pity 
and collective action, see Table 3). All models reported in the paper have been identified 
(with degrees of freedom equal to or higher than zero). 
Discussion of Study 1 
Our hypothesis that injustice awareness had and indirect effect via pity and outrage on 
donation and collective action intentions, was supported. Outrage and collective action were 
strongly correlated in previous studies (Thomas & McGarty, 2009), where the target groups 
were socially and politically disadvantaged, but not necessarily economically deprived. In this 
study, however, pity as an expression of the acknowledgement of economic deprivation was 
the stronger predictor of these actions. This may be explained by the lack of injustice scenario 
(that is common in collective action research) in this study that could have evoked outrage, 
whereas the other-focused emotion of pity could be more generally present among 
participants. 
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Study 2 
We intended to replicate our findings in connection with refugees in Germany and in 
Hungary. Similarly to the Roma, refugees in Europe need the assistance of volunteers to 
fulfill their basic needs for resources and safety, but they also need the political support in the 
representation of their interests. Refugees have multiple disadvantages, such as linguistic 
difficulties, lacking documents of professional qualifications, and relevant work experience 
(Trines, 2017), being targets of prejudice (see e.g. Osborne, 2016; von der Mark, 2016). The 
pro-refugee movement underlines that people can engage in pro-social action on behalf of 
refugees, both in the forms of donations and volunteering and political activism (Hamann & 
Karakayali, 2016).  
We collected data from a German sample in Study 2a to improve the generalizability 
of our findings by looking at a different societal context in which pro-social intentions were 
more widespread and normative (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). At the time of our data 
collection in 2016, the official policy regarding refugees in Germany was mostly accepting, 
and pro-refugee volunteers acted in line with dominant social norms of the country (Verkaik, 
2017). In Study 2b our goal was to replicate 2a with a representative sample in the Hungarian 
context where, in contrast to Germany, the government took an openly hostile stance against 
refugees and immigrants. Given the different sampling strategies our focus here is on 
comparing relationships not mean levels of responses. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. In Study 2a, data were collected at a German university 
with the assistance of students in 2016 by an online survey using convenience sampling (N = 
191). We found no outliers based on the outlier analysis of SPSS from the mean of variables 
used in the path model. 
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Fifty percent of participants were women, and their mean age was 36.9 (SD = 14) 
years; 43.5 % had secondary school degree, 38.2% university degree; 17.6% did not respond. 
The sample size was suboptimal for a path model, as the optimal number of participants is 
determined as being higher than 200 (Kline, 2011). However, others suggest that 10:1 ratio of 
cases to free parameters is acceptable (Bentler & Chou, 1987), especially for simple models 
as ours. Besides, we had to work with the available data collected at one time point, as the 
changing political situation and policies did not allow us to extend the data collection period.  
In Study 2b we conducted an online survey as part of an omnibus research in Hungary 
in 2018, relying on a sample recruited with an identical method as in Study 1. The sample was 
randomly split and the other half or respondents completed a different survey, resulting in N = 
563. Fifty-two percentage of participants were women, their mean age was 41.5 (SD = 13) 
years. 34.3% of participants had a degree in higher education, 62.7 % finished secondary 
school, 3% had not finished secondary school. 16.3 % lived in Budapest, 54.9 % lived in 
smaller towns, and 29.1% in a village and 0.7 % abroad.  
We had four outliers from the mean of ally collective action intention, but this number 
was low compared to sample size, so we kept them in the analysis. 
Measures. All items are presented in Appendix A. Injustice awareness was measured 
more directly compared to Study 1, by five new items. Pity and outrage were measured with 
single items again. Donation intention was measured by three items, also more directly. 
Collective action intention was measured by four items reacting to the following scenario: 
“Imagine that a great number of refugees have to move to your neighborhood. What is the 
likelihood that you would participate in the following actions?” The response scale in all 
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measures ranged from 1 = I do not agree at all, to 7 = I completely agree. The language of the 
questionnaire in Study 2a was German, and in Study 2b it was Hungarian. 
Results of Study 2a 
Descriptive Statistics. Injustice awareness, and pity were close to the midpoint of the 
scale, while donation and collective action intentions were low. Outrage about the refugee 
policy was high. Results showed that all elements of the model were significantly correlated, 
with outrage as an exception. Outrage was negatively correlated with pity, but it was not 
associated with any other variables. For scale reliabilities, means, and correlations see Table 
4. 
 Hypothesis Testing. Again, we used the model trimming method. Outrage had no 
significant connections in the model, so we trimmed the non-significant paths between 
injustice awareness and outrage (B = .09; SE =.09; p = .317; β = .07), outrage and collective 
action intentions (B =.04; SE = 0.04; p = .414; β = .02), and outrage and donation intentions 
(B =.05; SE =.04; p = .105; β = .05). The resulting trimmed model, illustrated in Figure 3, 
showed good fit (see Table 3). 
Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action intentions (B =.82; SE 
=.06; p < .001; β = .66) and donation intentions (B = 0.42; SE =.06; p < .001; β = .39). 
Injustice awareness was a strong predictor of pity (B =.72; SE =.07; p < .001; β = .60), and 
pity was a stronger predictor of donation intention (B =.45; SE =.05; p < .001; β = .51) than of 
collective action intentions (B =.27; SE =.05; p < .001; β = .26). Pity and outrage had a 
negative connection (β = -.34; p < .001); and collective action intentions and donation 
intentions have a positive connection (β = .28; p < .001). Pity was a significant mediator 
between injustice awareness and collective action intentions (see Table 2). 
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The path between pity and collective action intention was significantly higher than 
between outrage and collective action (t =3.82, df = 378, p < .001). By trimming the path 
between feeling pity and collective action intention, the model fit significantly decreased (see 
Table 3).  
Results of Study 2b 
Descriptive Statistics. All study variables were significantly correlated. Pity and 
outrage were close to the midpoint, while injustice awareness and behavioral intentions were 
lower. The correlation between injustice awareness and pity was strong, as the correlation 
between pity and behavioral intentions, too. The connection between outrage and behavioral 
intentions were weaker. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations between variables, see 
Table 5. 
Hypothesis Testing. All connections between variables were significant, therefore we 
kept the saturated model with perfect fit this time (see Figure 4.) Injustice awareness was 
connected to both collective action intentions (B =.41, SE =.01; p < .001; β =.43) and donation 
intentions (B = .52, SE = .01; p < .001; β = .46). Pity was a predictor of both donation 
intentions (B =.38, SE =.01; p < .001; β = .42) and collective action intentions (B =.26, SE = 
.01; p < .001; β = .33). Pity and outrage had a positive connection (B = .35, SE = .03 p < .001; 
β = .15); and collective action intentions and donation intentions also had a positive 
connection (B =.47, SE= .01 p < .001; β = .52). Pity, again, was a significant mediator 
between injustice awareness and collective action intention (see Table 2). 
Here too, the path between pity and collective action intentions was stronger than 
between outrage and collective action (t = 17.11, df = 1, p < .001). We found a significant 
decrease in model fit when erasing the path between pity and collective action intentions (see 
Table 3). 
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Discussion of Study 2  
In both samples, pity was a stronger predictor of collective action intention than 
outrage was, replicating the pattern in Study 1. The results from a different intergroup context 
and from two different countries strengthen our assumption that in case of both economically 
and politically marginalized groups, pity can play an important role in pro-social action.  
However, we must note an unexpected finding that in Study 2a outrage had a 
connection neither with injustice awareness, nor with collective action intention. The most 
feasible explanation for this result is specific context of Germany at the time of data 
collection. The item measuring outrage may have been ambiguous because people could 
perceive the policies as either too supportive or not supportive enough. Unfortunately, we had 
no way to confirm this interpretation in the current study. In contrast, in Study 2b, outrage 
was connected to injustice awareness, indicating that outrage about the refugee policy in 
Hungary reflected a pro-refugee stand among respondents.  
Study 3 
We contend that the mobilizing function of pity would be different for groups that are 
politically disadvantaged, but do not suffer severe economic hardships. Therefore, we tested 
our model in connection with gay people. Sexual minorities, similarly to the Roma and 
refugees, are targets of social and political disadvantages connected to prejudice and 
discrimination (Calcagno, 2016; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008), but unlike 
these groups, they do not uniformly suffer economic deprivation (McGarrity & Huebner, 
2013). In line with this, they may be perceived as a more competent and agentic group (see 
Cuddy et. al., 2007), therefore feeling pity, a reaction to the group’s suffering may be less 
relevant than outrage in predicting collective action intentions. For example, empathy was not 
a significant mediator between intergroup contact and ally collective action for LGBT people 
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(Fingerhut, 2011). Furthermore, pity may express undesirable paternalistic attitudes that 
hinder political action intentions (Russell & Bohan, 2016). In line with this, we altered our 
prediction of the model in relation to support for gay people. We maintained our prediction 
regarding injustice awareness, but expected that outrage would predict collective action 
intentions more strongly than pity. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. For an estimation of sample size for the path model, 
G*Power analysis suggested N = 311 for 95% power to detect a small effect size of Cohen’s 
f2 = .02 (Cohen, 1988), which we set as the minimum number. We used a university pool 
consisting of students from all faculties of a state university in Hungary, where they received 
course credit for participation. We reached a higher sample size than planned (N = 475), 76.2 
% of participants were women, their average age was 21.06 (SD = 2.2) years.  
Measures. Measures were identical to those in Study 2 but tailored to the target group 
of gay people (see Appendix A). We are aware that the category “gay people” (melegek in 
Hungarian) is restrictive, but decided to use the term which is the most commonly applied 
label in Hungarian for sexual minorities (used in official publications, in the name of NGOs 
and a hotline for LGBTQI+ people). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics. All variables were significantly correlated, but the connections 
between pity and behavioral outcomes were weaker, compared to the connections between 
outrage and behavioral outcomes. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations, see Table 6. 
There were no outliers and extreme responses. 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      20 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing. The only non-significant path we removed from the model was 
between pity and donation intentions (B = 0.07; SE = 0.04; p = .062; β = .08). The resulting 
trimmed model (Figure 5) showed good fit to our data (see Table 3). 
Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action intentions (B =.73; SE = 
0.05; p < .001; β =.60) and donation intentions (B =.48; SE =.06; p < .001; β = .42). Outrage 
was a predictor of both donation intentions (B =.24; SE = .05; p < .001; β = .25) and collective 
action intentions (B =.23; SE =.04; p < .001; β = .23). There was a weak connection between 
pity and collective action intentions (B =.05; SE =.02; p = .033; β =.05). Pity and outrage had 
a positive connection (B =.58; SE =.10 p < .001; β = .26); and collective action intentions and 
donation intentions too (B =.96; SE=.08 p < .001; β = .65). Injustice awareness had a 
significant effect on collective action intention via both pity and outrage. For the mediation 
analysis, see Table 2. 
The path between outrage and collective action intentions was significantly stronger, 
compared to the path between pity and collective action intentions (t = 3.75, df = 946, p < 
.001). This time, when erasing the path between pity and collective action intention, there was 
no significant decrease in model fit, in contrast to all previous models with economically 
disadvantaged target groups (see Table 3). 
Discussion of Study 3 
As expected, outrage was a stronger predictor of behavioral intentions than pity in the 
context of relations to gay people. Surprisingly, outrage was not only a predictor of collective 
action intentions, but also of donation intentions, while this connection was not present in the 
models of marginalized groups of Study 1 and 2. This suggests that among those reporting 
outrage, both forms of action can express support on behalf of the outgroup. 
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Injustice awareness had a weaker connection to pity and pity did not relate to donation 
intentions, which suggests in this particular intergroup context, pity is not linked to donation 
intentions. Compared to the previous studies pity had a much smaller role in predicting 
behavioral outcomes, as indicated by the lack of significant decrease in model fit after 
removing this path from the model.  
Study 4 
In studies 1-3 we examined the connection between pity and collective action 
intentions compared to outrage in connection with different groups using cross-sectional 
survey data. The strength of our surveys was that we measured attitudes and action intentions 
toward real groups across different contexts ensuring high external validity. We relied on the 
assumption that perceived economic hardship is a meaningful source of the difference when it 
comes to the role of pity in mobilization. However, we did not directly measure whether the 
difference was connected to the groups experiencing different forms of disadvantages. In a 
new study we wanted to demonstrate that the different functions of pity on ally action are 
indeed dependent on the type of disadvantage. Furthermore, we did not have evidence about 
the causal relationship between pity and collective action intentions. Using an experimental 
design we could test perceptions of a causal connection between emotion and action. 
Furthermore, we extended the measure of pity from a one-item measure to three items, so we 
could test the effect of different but related emotion labels. 
In our study we manipulated a) the type of disadvantage and b) the emotional reaction 
of a fictitious ally to economic and political versus only political disadvantage. We tested 
participants’ attributed action intention to the fictitious ally, which highlighted their 
expectations how emotions and behavioural intentions are related in specific contexts. We 
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also tested their own emotional reaction to the situation and their consequent ally collective 
action intentions.  
Hypotheses 
In line with our overall hypothesis, but adapted to the specific procedure of the 
experiment, we expected that when participants had to evaluate a fictitious character’s ally 
action intentions in a situation in which the outgroup was only politically disadvantaged, they 
would attribute higher collective action intentions when the character showed outrage and 
lower intentions when he showed pity. However, we expected no differences between pity 
and outrage in their effect on collective action intentions when the outgroup was both 
economically and politically disadvantaged (H1). We also expected that their own emotional 
reaction of outrage, but not pity, would predict intentions to engage in ally action when the 
outgroup is politically (but not economically) disadvantaged, but no such differences would 
be found when the outgroup is both politically and economically disadvantaged (H2).    
Method 
Procedure. In an online experiment, participants were randomly assigned into one of 
four conditions based on disadvantage type (economic and political versus political) and 
emotion (pity versus outrage). We introduced an imaginary country, Anduria, where there is a 
divide between city and village inhabitants. Villagers suffer either economic (deprivation of 
basic needs) and political disadvantages (violation of rights) at the same time, or only political 
disadvantages (for a detailed description of the vignettes see Appendix B). We framed our 
story as a news item, accompanied by an illustration that was shared on Facebook by an 
Andurian citizen from the city (i.e., a potential ally to village inhabitants). To manipulate the 
emotions related to the story, the Andurian citizen shared the news with a comment that stated 
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either his pity or outrage about the situation. To reinforce the message, the comment was 
followed either by a sad or an angry emoji.  
Participants. For an estimation of sample size for the path model, we relied on the 
same calculation as in Study 3, but we aimed to reach as high sample size as possible to 
increase the reliability of the results. First, we recruited participants on Facebook (n = 287) 
and offered a raffle price of vouchers of 12.000 HUF (37 Euros). We posted the call on 
Facebook pages and groups. Second, we recruited participants from a university course (n = 
316).  
We had 304 participants in the economic and political condition, and 299 participants 
in the political condition, reaching a total N = 603. We excluded only those participants who 
quit the questionnaire before responding to our main outcome measure, ally collective action 
intention. We had 7 outliers that deviated from the mean of injustice awareness, 11 outliers on 
the scale of prosocial emotions and no outliers in the scale of outrage. We had 8 outliers in 
ally collective action, and 5 outliers in donation intentions. As the sample size was big 
enough, we kept them in the analysis. 
Seventy four percent of participant (449) were women, and 25% men (140), 14 did not 
report their gender or chose “other”. The vast majority of respondents were university 
students. The average age was 26.2 years (SD = 9.8). The majority of respondents, 49.8% 
were from the capital, and 34.3% came from another city or town, and 14.3 % from a village.4 
Measures. We used a manipulation check to test if participants identified economic 
and political disadvantage in each condition. We also used an attention check question to see 
 
4 As those living in villages might be more personally involved by our fictitious scenario, we conducted a T-test if there is a 
difference based on the residential status of participants in injustice awareness, emotions and collective action intentions,  but 
we did not find any difference between groups. 
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if respondents could recall our fictitious character’s emotional reaction. Injustice awareness 
was measured by the same four items as in Study 3, tailored to the fictitious scenario. 
We asked about emotional response in the following way “Imagine that you are also a 
citizen of Anduria living in one of the main cities. If you think of the situation of village 
inhabitants to what extent do the following emotions describe what you feel?”, we listed pity, 
sadness, and sympathy. Pity was previously conceptualized as having the element of sadness, 
according to multiple authors, such as Cuddy and colleagues (2007, p:635), stating that pity 
consists of compassion and sadness. A study by Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger (1999) 
also empirically supported that the experience of pity was highly related to sadness and 
sorrow, but also to sympathy. We expected that sympathy is a somewhat more positive 
emotion compared to pity, but this measure allowed us to test the effects of the different 
emotion labels separately, and also as aggregated variables. We also created a scale for 
outrage, using the words anger, wrath, and outrage. 
We first asked about how the fictitious character would act. We used the same 
collective action and donation measures as in Study 2 and 3 and tailored them to the context 
of Anduria. Finally, we asked participants about their own collective action and donation 
intentions if they were city inhabitants of Anduria. For scale reliabilies, see Table 7. For the 
list of items tailored to the experiment, see Appendix A. 
Results 
Attention and Manipulation Checks. We did not find a difference in the perception 
of political disadvantage between the conditions (Economic condition: M = 6.25, SD = .87; 
Political condition: M = 6.24, SD = .93, t(596) = .22, p = .825), but we did in the perception of 
economic disadvantage (Economic condition: M = 6.25 SD = .74; Political condition: M = 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      25 
 
 
3.69, SD = 1.55, t(596) = 25.76, p < .001). We found no differences in injustice awareness 
between the economic and political and only political conditions, we had a ceiling effect in 
both cases (Economic condition: M = 6.01, SD = .84; Political condition: M = 6.03, SD = .87, 
t(594) = 1.05, p = .294). 
Attention checks showed that not all participants noticed the manipulated emotions or 
could recall them correctly. In the pity condition, 20 (6.3%) wrongly indicated outrage and 53 
(16.7 %) could not recall the emotion. In the outrage condition, 17 (5.9%) wrongly indicated 
pity, and 36 (12.5%) could not recall the emotion. Four (1.3%) participants’ responses were 
missing in both conditions. As 134 out of 603 participants could not precisely indicate the 
appropriate emotion, we tested our hypotheses with the exclusion of these people. This left us 
with a sample of 469 participants, 240 in the pity, and 229 in the outrage condition. 
Descriptive Statistics. For means, standard deviations and correlations in the full 
sample, see Table 7. Attributed collective action and donation intentions were high overall, 
and participants’ own action intentions were somewhat lower, but still above the midpoint. 
Injustice awareness was very high, corresponding to our goal to present a story with high 
level of injustice. Attributed action intentions to the fictitious character strongly correlated 
with participant’s own action intentions. Injustice awareness and own emotions were strongly 
associated with participant’s own action intentions, and only weakly connected to attributed 
action intentions.  
 Hypothesis Testing with ANOVA and Planned Comparisons. As we expected that 
the emotion manipulations would have an effect on the attribution of behavioural intention to 
the fictitious character (but not on participants’ own collective action), we conducted two- 
way ANOVA for the effect of disadvantage type (economic and political versus only 
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political) and emotion (pity versus outrage) on attributed collective action intention. We found 
no significant main effect of disadvantage type, reinforcing that the two scenarios did not 
differ in their mobilization for collective action. There was a significant main effect of 
emotion on collective action intentions. We found no interaction effect between disadvantage 
type and emotion. For donation intentions, both the main effect of disadvantage type and 
emotion was significant, but there was no interaction between conditions. For results of the 
ANOVA, see Table 8. 
 We conducted planned comparisons between the emotion conditions to compare the 
effects on attributed collective action, separately within the economic scenario, and within the 
political scenario. We chose paired comparisons, because our hypotheses focused on the 
comparison of the two emotions in the two contexts independently.  
There was no difference in attributed collective action intention between the pity 
condition and outrage condition in the economic disadvantage scenario. In the political 
scenario, attributed collective action intention was higher in the outrage condition compared 
to the pity condition.5 For descriptive statistics and results of the T-tests, see Table 9. 
 In summary, ANOVA analysis highlighted that pity and outrage had significantly 
different effects on attributed collective action, and planned comparisons specified that the 
difference was significant only in the political, but not in the economic condition. We 
expected the changing role of pity and the same role of outrage throughout the contexts, 
therefore we did not expect and did not find an interaction between disadvantage type and 
 
5 We ran the t-tests without the removal of participants who failed the manipulation check as well, and received 
similar results as in the full sample, no difference in collective action intention between pity and outrage in the economic 
condition (Pity: M = 4.98, SD = 1,09; Outrage: M = 5.02, SD = 1.14, t(302) = -.351, p = .726, Cohen’s d = .04), and a 
significant difference between emotions in the political condition (Pity: M = 4.77, SD = 1.19; Outrage: M = 5.19, SD = 1.07, 
t(297) = -3.12, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .37). 
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emotion. In line with our expectation, donation intentions were higher in response to the 
economic/political disadvantage scenario. 
Hypothesis Testing with Path Analysis. Based on participants’ own reaction to the 
economic and political versus political scenarios, we built the model the same way as in 
Studies 1–3, where injustice awareness predicted behavioural intentions of donation and 
collective action, and the connection occurred via pity and outrage.  
First, we tested whether participants’ own emotional responses were independent from 
the manipulation. Respondents’ own emotions were not affected by the presented emotional 
response of the fictitious ally (Pity: t(594) = .184, p = .854; Outrage: t(594) = -1.13, p = .261). 
Based on the random assignment and the lack of effect of this manipulation on their own 
emotional reaction, we were confident to compare the role of their own emotional responses 
in predicting their own action intention responses. We conducted separate analyses on the 
subsamples in the combined economic and political and in the political only conditions.  
First, we conducted the analysis with single item emotion measures (outrage and pity), 
similarly to the four correlational studies. Then, we used the 3 item-scale for prosocial 
emotions and conducted the same path analysis. We conducted additional analysis for 
comparison with each single item (sadness, sympathy alone), and with combined items 
(pity/sadness and pity/sympathy, as a scale). We reported our results in the Supplementary 
material. 
Path analysis with the 1 item measure (pity). In the economic disadvantage condition, 
there were two non-significant paths: between injustice awareness and collective action 
intention (B = .09; SE = .08; p = .277; β = .06), injustice awareness and donation intention (B 
= -.06; SE = .09; p = .530; β = -.04), therefore we trimmed these two paths.  
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The trimmed model had good fit indices (see Table 3). Both emotions were significant 
predictors of behavior intentions, but unlike the pattern in correlational data, outrage was a 
stronger predictor of collective action intention than pity. Pity, however, was a stronger 
predictor of donation intention than outrage. For the results of the mediation analysis, see 
Table 2.  
In the political disadvantage condition, there were three non-significant paths: between 
injustice awareness and collective action intention (B = .06; SE = .07; p = .385; β = .05), 
injustice awareness and donation intention (B = -.04; SE = .09; p = .674; β = -.03) and 
between pity and donation intention (B = .09; SE = .06; p = .131; β =.09). 
The trimmed model had good fit indices (χ2 = 3.55; df = 3, CFI = .999, NFI = .992., 
RMSEA = .025). Both emotions were significant predictors of behavior intentions, but in line 
with our prediction, outrage was a stronger predictor of collective action intention than pity. 
Donation was only predicted by outrage, but not by pity.  
Path analysis with a 3-item measure (pity, sympathy, sadness). In the economic 
disadvantage condition, there were three non-significant paths we trimmed: between injustice 
awareness and collective action intention (B = .06; SE = .08; p = .430; β = .05), injustice 
awareness and donation intention (B = -.11; SE = .09; p = .219; β = -.07), and outrage and 
donation intention (B = .07 SE = .06; p = .225; β = .08). The model had good fit indices (see 
Table 3). Both emotions were significant predictors of behavior intentions, but pity more 
strongly predicted collective action intention than outrage. Pity was also a stronger predictor 
of donation intention than outrage. For the results of the mediation analysis, see Table 2. 
In the political disadvantage condition, we trimmed the two non-significant paths 
between injustice awareness and collective action intention (B = .10; SE = .07; p = .176; β = 
.072) and between injustice awareness and donation intentions (B = -.092; SE = .090; p = 
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.308; β = -.06), and the resulting model had a good model fit (see Table 3). In this condition, 
outrage was a stronger predictor of collective action intention than pity. Outrage was also a 
stronger predictor of donation intention, than pity. For the results of the mediation analysis, 
see Table 2. For a summary of findings of the path models (with 1 and 3-item measures), see 
Figure 6.  
In the additional path analyses with the different combinations of items, we found that 
two-item combinations (pity, sympathy and pity, sadness) provided the same pattern as the 
three-item solution. However, the one-item sadness measure (similarly to the one-item pity 
measure) was a weaker predictor of collective action intention compared to outrage, but the 
one-item sympathy measure was stronger, than outrage, on behalf of economically 
disadvantaged groups. The pattern for politically disadvantaged groups were more uniform 
(outrage being stronger than prosocial emotions). For the path models, see the Supplementary 
material. 
Comparison of paths. We compared the emotion- behavioral intention paths using 
the 3-item scales for both pity and outrage. In the economic scenario, the path between pity 
and collective action intentions was stronger compared to the path between outrage and 
collective action intentions, (t = 2.11, df = 604, p = .03) while the opposite pattern occurred in 
the political scenario (t = 2.43, df = 594, p = .02). Erasing the path between pity and collective 
action intention deteriorated the model fit significantly in the economic scenario, while it 
changed fit indices to a smaller extent in the political scenario (with still a significant change 
in Chi square, but an acceptable CFI and NFI). For the comparison of fit indices, see Table 3. 
Discussion of Study 4 
In line with our predictions, we found that pity and outrage were equally relevant 
emotions in the mobilization for collective action and donation in case of an economically and 
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politically disadvantaged outgroup. In contrast, in case of an outgroup that was only 
politically, but not economically disadvantaged, outrage was a stronger predictor for 
collective action intention than pity. This pattern was identified in the action intentions 
attributed to the fictitious character, in line with findings of Study 1, 2 and 3. 
When we looked at participants’ own action intentions, the role of pity in comparison 
to other prosocial emotions showed a more nuanced picture. In the path analysis, pity, 
measured by a single item, was a weaker predictor of collective action, compared to outrage 
on behalf economically disadvantaged groups. However, pity with sympathy and sadness 
became a stronger predictor than outrage, but only in the economic scenario, consistent with 
the results of Studies 1 and 2. In the political scenario, such nuances between prosocial 
emotions did not appear, as pity, sympathy, and sadness were uniformly less relevant in 
mobilization for collective action compared to outrage.  
The inconsistent finding with the single item pity measure raises the question, why this 
emotion functioned differently in the real life (Study 1 and 2) versus in the fictitious scenario 
(Study 4). A possible explanation is that in studies 1 and 2, the only prosocial emotion we 
“offered” to participants was pity, while in Study 4, we assessed pity, sympathy, and sadness 
one after the other, which might have led to a contrast effect, and a preference for sympathy 
compared to pity (even in line with social desirability). However, when pity was combined 
with either sympathy or sadness or both, we again found consistent results, which suggests 
that even if these emotions are distinguishable, they are closely related.  
A limitation of this study is that we cannot completely clarify the difference between 
sympathy and pity, but we could highlight the mobilization potential of these prosocial 
emotions for economically disadvantaged, but not for politically disadvantaged groups. 
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Our experiment had some further limitations. Firstly, we did not manipulate 
participants’ own emotions, therefore, our outcome variable was the expected collective 
action by an ally. By this, we investigated perceptions of normative behaviors depending on 
the type of disadvantage and emotional reactions of pity vs. outrage. Nevertheless, we could 
also investigate the connections between participants’ own emotions and collective action 
intentions in light of the type of outgroup disadvantage.  
Another problem was that we used images in addition to the description to manipulate 
the type of disadvantage. By using an image of a child in the economic condition we aimed to 
reinforce the vignette that also explicitly mentions how children are affected by economic 
disadvantages, compared to the political condition where children were also mentioned as 
affected, but on a more abstract level (so we used an abstract image). It is part of our 
argument that perceived vulnerability accounts for the pity- ally collective action intention 
link: the more a target group is perceived as being needy and deprived, the more prosocial 
emotions are evoked, which can motivate supportive behavior in more possible forms (not 
only as donation, but also as collective action).  
However, it can be raised whether purely the description of economic disadvantage or 
also the image of a child drove the effect of the manipulation. Still, the fact that there was no 
main effect of disadvantage type on attributed collective action intentions, and no difference 
in participants’ own collective action intentions between scenarios, is in line with the view 
that the picture did not have a confounding effect on our main dependent variable, collective 
action intentions. Furthermore, the fact that our results in Study 4 are consistent with the 
findings in studies 1-3 supports the reliability of findings. 
 
General Discussion  
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Most collective action studies use small to medium purposive or convenience samples 
with scenarios involving imagined transgressions in experimental design.  A strength of our 
research is that it investigated ally action intentions with big community samples not only 
from Western democracies, but also from Eastern Europe. Our main findings were replicated 
in the German and the Hungarian context, in connection with two real groups, the Roma and 
refugees. Finally, our findings were supported by an experiment. 
Previous research have not addressed the specific conditions under which pity as a 
prosocial emotion can have a distinguished role in collective action. We argued that toward 
both economically and politically deprived groups, similarly to outrage, pity leads to prosocial 
behavioral intentions and even collective action intention, but we did not expect that function 
of pity for economically not deprived groups. We conducted Study 1 and 2 to test the ally 
intentions of advantaged group members in intergroup contexts that reflected both large 
economic and social/political injustices. In Study 3 we contrasted these to a model for a group 
that was socially and politically but not economically disadvantaged. Finally, in Study 4, we 
compared the role of pity and outrage toward an economically and politically versus only 
politically disadvantaged fictitious group in an experiment. 
Pity was a stronger predictor of donation intentions than of collective action intentions 
in all models connected to economically marginalized groups but predicted both behaviors in 
all cases. In fact, collective action intentions were just as strongly, or even more strongly 
predicted by pity than by outrage in all three intergroup contexts of Study 1 and 2 (in 
connection to the Roma and refugees). This pattern was partly found in the scenario of the 
economically disadvantaged in the experiment of Study 4. We argue that the reason for this is 
that pity is an adequate emotional response towards groups in need of material resources 
where allies recognize the injustice of the situation, so prosocial action lead to both ally 
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collective action and donation intentions. In contrast, Study 3 and the scenario of the 
politically disadvantaged outgroup in Study 4 demonstrated that pity is less adequate when a 
group is not economically deprived, but socially and politically disadvantaged, therefore it 
leads to ally collective action intention to less extent, compared to outrage. In connection with 
gay people and with the fictitious group in the political disadvantage condition, outrage was a 
more important predictor of collective action. Outrage about policies is a more adequate 
response to their disadvantage, compared to feeling pity toward them. 
An additional explanation for the stronger effect of pity compared to outrage 
concerning marginalized outgroups may be that pity is a more sustainable emotion than 
outrage or anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Prosocial emotions such as pity could be 
more generally present among members of the advantaged group, as it is an other-focused 
emotion that could appear even in the absence of a specific reason for grievance (Thomas et 
al., 2009). Therefore, pity or sympathy can be a useful basis for mobilization on behalf of the 
severely deprived. 
Our findings suggest that in intergroup contexts with large status differences, the main 
division is not between actions that maintain the status quo by offering “only” donations 
versus engaging in politicized actions for social change, but rather between acting at all or not 
doing anything. The social change potential of a specific emotion and action might be 
dependent on the intergroup context, therefore feeling pity (and giving donation) is not 
uniformly paternalistic (Becker et al., 2018), it can be an adequate response to a groups’ 
suffering. Helping in the form of donations based on feelings of pity may be psychologically 
similar to engagement in political action in these particular intergroup contexts.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
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In the present research, we did not focus on the differences between shades of 
prosocial emotions, which is also an interesting field for future research. We used the 
Hungarian expression “sajnálat” and the German word “Mitleid” to measure pity, which 
makes the picture complex. Emotions of sympathy and pity have different meanings in 
English, and different connotations in other languages (Frijda, Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995; 
Russell, 1991). A recent study highlighted, how much the meaning of emotions is dependent 
on the traditions of specific language families, and pity is exactly that type of emotion which 
has different connotations in each context. Pity is closer to grief in Indo-European languages, 
but it is also related to love in other languages (Jackson et al., 2019). Nevertheless, emotions 
are not “natural kinds” (i.e., biologically determined), but a result of subjective categorization 
and social learning (Feldman Barrett, 2006). Our goal in the current study was not to look at 
the differences between specific prosocial emotions, but to compare the role of pity to outrage 
in mobilization within specific intergroup contexts.  
We used a one-item measure of pity in Studies 1-3, which is a clear limitation of our 
studies. Therefore, in Study 4, we used not only an item for pity, but added sympathy and 
sadness, so we could use each item independently and in combination to see how measures 
influence findings. This left us with mixed results: unlike survey findings, pity alone was not 
a better predictor for collective actin compared to outrage, only when it was used together 
with sympathy or sadness. This suggests that sympathy was a slightly more mobilizing 
emotion than pity among participants, and together with pity they were more important 
predictors of action, than outrage, but only in case of economically disadvantaged groups. 
Such differences between prosocial emotions did not appear toward politically disadvantaged 
groups, as they were uniformly weaker predictors in comparison to outrage.  
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It is important to note that by highlighting the special function of pity toward deprived 
groups does not mean that we want to promote pity as a mobilizing emotion compared to 
other prosocial emotions, such as sympathy or empathy. In contrast, we argued that pity can 
be a “good enough” emotion, as a reflection to an outgroup’s perceived low status, when the 
outgroup suffers not only socio-political but material disadvantages. We proposed that such 
perceptions, even without high identification with the outgroup, indicated by sympathy or 
empathy, can raise pity, which in turn can lead to behavioral intentions on behalf of the 
outgroup. 
 Giving a helping hand in the form of either collective action or donations can function 
as an opportunity for the advantaged to get involved on behalf of the marginalized to restore 
social justice. Furthermore, mobilizing a wider pool of advantaged group members based on 
prosocial emotions can be an important step toward achieving the social change that political 
activists also strive for. 
  
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      36 
 
 
 
 
References 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Making Processes, 50, 179 –211. 
Arbuckle, J. L. (2011). IBM SPSS AMOS 20 user's guide. Chicago, IL: IBM Corporation. 
Badkhen, A. (2016, January). Refugees don’t need your pity. Foreign Policy. 
Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/26/refugees -dont-need-
your-pity-migrants-dispossesed-senegal/  
Batson (2010). Empathy-induced altruistic motivation. In Mikulincer, M. & Shaver, P.R. 
(Eds.). Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature. (pp. 
15-34). Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Batson, C. D., & Ahmad, N. Y. (2009). Using empathy to improve intergroup attitudes and 
relations. Social Issues and Policy Review, 3, 141-177. 
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., & Stocks, E. L. (2016). Benefits and liabilities of empathy-induced 
altruism. In: Miller (Ed.). The social psychology of good and evil (pp. 359-385). New 
York: Guilford Publications. 
Batson, C. D., Chang, J., Orr, R., & Rowland, J. (2002). Empathy, attitudes, and action: Can 
feeling for a member of a stigmatized group motivate one to help the 
group? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1656-1666. 
Becker, J. (2012). Virtual special issue on theory and research on collective action in the 
European Journal of Social Psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 19-
23. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.1839 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      37 
 
 
Becker, J.C., Ksenofontov, I., Siem, B., & Love, A. (2018). The social change potential of 
autonomy- and dependency-oriented help toward refugees. Paper submitted for 
publication. 
Becker, J. C., Tausch, N., & Wagner, U. (2011). Emotional consequences of collective action 
participation: Differentiating self-directed and outgroup-directed 
emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1587-1598. 
Bentler, P. M., & Chou, C.-P. (1987). Practical issues in structural equation modeling. 
Sociological Methods and Research, 16, 78–117.  
Boler, M. (1997). The risks of empathy: Interrogating multiculturalism's gaze. Cultural 
studies, 11, 253-273. 
Calcagno, J. (2016). Transforming straight guilt into collective action for LGBs via close 
cross-group friendships: A gender-moderated process. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 40, 451-463. 
Carver, C.S., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2009). Anger is an approach-related affect: Evidence and  
implications. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 183-204. doi: 10.1037/a0013965 
Cohen, J. (1988). The effect size index: d. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral 
sciences, 2, 284-288. 
Council of Europe (2012). Human rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe. Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publications. Retrieved from 
https://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/prems79611_GBR_CouvHumanRight
sOfRoma_WEB.pdf 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      38 
 
 
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup 
affect and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 631-648. 
De Gruyter, C. (2016, March 16). Integrate refugees with help, not pity. Carnegie Europe. 
Retrieved from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/63052 
Dijker, A. J. (2001). The influence of perceived suffering and vulnerability on the experience 
of pity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 659-676. 
Dijker, A. J. (2014). A theory of vulnerability-based morality. Emotion Review, 6, 175-183. 
Dijker, A. J., & Koomen, W. (2003). Extending Weiner's attribution-emotion model of 
stigmatization of ill persons. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 251, 51-68.  
Farkas, L. (2014). Report on discrimination of Roma children in education. European 
Commission, Brussels, 2014. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_childdiscrimination_en.pdf 
Feischmidt, M., Szombati, K., & Szuhay, P. (2013). Collective criminalization of Roma in 
Central and Eastern Europe: social causes, circumstances and consequences. In 
S. Body-Gendrot, M. Hough, K. Kerezsi, R. Levy, & S. Snacken (Eds.), The Routledge 
Handbook of European Criminology (pp. 168–187). London UK: Routledge. 
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience 
of emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 20-46. 
Fernando, J.W., Kashima, Y., & Laham, S.M. (2014). Multiple emotions: A person-centered 
approach to the relationship between intergroup emotion and action orientation.  
Emotion, 14, 722-732. doi: 10.1037/a0036103  
Fingerhut, A.W. (2011). Straight allies: What predicts heterosexuals’ alliance with the LGBT 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      39 
 
 
community? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 41, 2230–2248. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2011.00807.x 
Florian, V., Mikulincer, M., & Hirschberger, G. (1999). The anatomy of a problematic 
emotion—the conceptualization and measurement of the experience of pity. Imagination, 
Cognition and Personality, 19, 3-25. 
Frijda, N. H., Markam, S., Sato, K., & Wiers, R. (1995). Emotions and emotion words. 
In Everyday conceptions of emotion (pp. 121-143). Springer, Dordrecht. 
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. Handbook of Affective Sciences, 11, 852-870. 
Halperin, E. (2014). Emotion, emotion regulation, and conflict resolution. Emotion Review, 6, 
68-76. 
Hamann, U., & Karakayali, S. (2016). Practicing Willkommenskultur: Migration and 
solidarity in Germany. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 2, 
69-86.  
Harth, N. S., Kessler, T., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Advantaged group’s emotional reactions to 
intergroup inequality: The dynamics of pride, guilt, and sympathy. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 115 - 129. doi: 10.1177/0146167207309193 
Iyer, A., Leach, C.W., & Crosby, F.J. (2003). White guilt and racial compensation: The 
benefits and limits of self-focus. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 117-
129. doi:10.1177/0146167202238377 
Jackson, J. C., Watts, J., Henry, T. R., List, J. M., Forkel, R., Mucha, P. J., ... & Lindquist, K. 
A. (2019). Emotion semantics show both cultural variation and universal 
structure. Science, 366, 1517-1522. 
Kende, A. (2016). Separating social science research on activism from social science as 
activism. The Journal of Social Issues, 72, 399-412. doi:10.1111/josi.12172 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      40 
 
 
Kende, A., Hadarics, M., & Lášticová, B. (2017). Anti-Roma attitudes as expressions of 
dominant social norms in Eastern Europe. International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations, 60, 12–27. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2017.06.002 
Kende, A., Lantos, N. A., Belinszky, A., Csaba, S., & Lukács, Z. A. (2017). The politicized 
motivations of volunteers in the refugee crisis: Intergroup helping as the means to 
achieve social change. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 5, 260–281. doi: 
10.5964/jspp.v5i1.642 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modelling (3rd ed.). New 
York, NY: Guilford. 
Konstan, D. (2015). Pity transformed. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of 
emotion. American Psychologist, 46, 819. 
Leach, C. W., Iyer, A., & Pedersen, A. (2006). Anger and guilt about ingroup advantage 
explain the willingness for political action. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 32, 1232-1245. 
Leach, C.W., Snider, S., & Iyer, A. (2002). “Poisoning the consciences of the fortunate”: The 
experience of relative advantage and support for social equality. In I. Walker & H.J. 
Smith (Eds.) Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration (pp.136-
163) New York, NY: Cambridge University.  
Lunardo, R., & Bezençon, V. (2015). The neglected ambivalent emotion of pity: 
Conceptualization and potential (complex) effects on charitable behavior. Advances in 
Consumer Research, 43, 624-625. 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      41 
 
 
Mackie, D. M., Silver, L. A., & Smith, E. R. (2004). Intergroup Emotions: Emotion as an 
Intergroup Phenomenon. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), Studies in emotion and 
social interaction. The social life of emotions (pp. 227-245). New York, NY, US: 
Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819568.013 
Macho, S., & Ledermann, T. (2011). Estimating, testing, and comparing specific effects in 
structural equation models: the phantom model approach. Psychological Methods, 16, 
34. 
Mallett, R. K., Huntsinger, J. R., Sinclair, S., & Swim, J. K. (2008). Seeing through their 
eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an 
outgroup. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 11, 451-470. 
Marullo, S., & Edwards, B. (2000). From charity to justice: The potential of university-
community collaboration for social change. The American Behavioral Scientist, 43, 895-
912. doi:10.1177/00027640021955540 
McGarrity, L. A., & Huebner, D. M. (2013). Is being out about sexual orientation uniformly 
healthy? The moderating role of socioeconomic status in a prospective study of gay and 
bisexual men. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 47, 28-38. 
Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. 
Social Justice Research, 3, 313-344. 
 Mufleh, L. (2017, July 25). Don't feel sorry for refugees - believe in them. Retrieved from 
https://www.ted.com/talks/luma_mufleh_don_t_feel_sorry_for_refugees_believe_in_the
m 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      42 
 
 
Nadler, A. (2002). Intergroup helping relations as power relations: Maintaining or challenging 
social dominance between groups through helping. The Journal of Social Issues, 58, 
487-502. doi:10.1111/1540-4560.00272 
Osborne, S. (2016, November 22). Nazi language becoming increasingly common in 
Germany's discussion of refugee crisis, researchers say. Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nazi-language-germany-refugee-
crisis-far-right-racism-a7429921.html 
Poll of polls (2018) Hungary Retrieved from: https://pollofpolls.eu/HU  
Radke, H.R.M., Kutlaca, M., Siem, B., Wright, S., & Becker, J.C. (Accepted/In 
press). Beyond allyship: Motivations for advantaged group members to engage in action 
for disadvantaged groups. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 
Russell, J. A. (1991). Culture, scripts, and children's understanding of emotion. In C. Saarni & 
P.L.Harris (Eds.), Children's understanding of emotion, (pp. 293-314). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Russell, G. M., & Bohan, J. S. (2016). Institutional allyship for LGBT equality: Underlying 
processes and potentials for change. Journal of Social Issues, 72, 335-354. 
Saab, R., Tausch, N., Spears, R., & Cheung, W.-Y. (2015). Acting in solidarity: Testing an 
extended dual pathway model of collective action by bystander group members. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 54, 539–560. doi: 10.1111/bjso.12095  
Schmitt, M., Behner, R., Montada, L., Müller, L., & Müller-Fohrbrodt, G. (2000). Gender, 
ethnicity, and education as privileges: Exploring the generalizability of the existential 
guilt reaction. Social Justice Research, 13, 313-337. 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      43 
 
 
Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Eveland,W. P.,& Kwak, N. (2005). Information and expression in a 
digital age modeling internet effects on civic participation. Communication 
Research, 32, 531-565. 
Selvanathan, H. P., Techakesari, P., Tropp, L. R., & Barlow, F. K. (2017). Whites for racial 
justice: How contact with Black Americans predicts support for collective action among 
White Americans. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, doi: 
10.1177/1368430217690908 
Smith, R. H. (2000). Assimilative and contrastive emotional reactions to upward and 
downward social comparisons. In Handbook of Social Comparison (pp. 173-200). 
Boston, MA: Springer. 
Streiner, D. L. (2006). Building a better model: an introduction to structural equation 
modelling. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 51, 317-324. 
Thomas, E. F., & McGarty, C. A. (2009). The role of efficacy and moral outrage norms in 
creating the potential for international development activism through group‐based 
interaction. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 115-134. 
Thomas, E. F., & McGarty, C. (2018). Giving versus acting: Using latent profile analysis to 
distinguish between benevolent and activist support for global poverty reduction. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 57, 189-209. 
Thomas, E.F., Mavor, K.I. and McGarty, C. (2012). Social identities facilitate and encapsulate 
actionrelevant constructs: A test of the social identity model of collective action. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 15, 75-88. doi: 10.1177/1368430211413619 
Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., & Mavor, K. I. (2009). Transforming “apathy into movement”: 
The role of pro-social emotions in motivating action for social change. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 13, 310–333. doi:10.1177/1088868309343290 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      44 
 
 
Trines, S. (2017, May 2). Lessons From Germany’s Refugee Crisis: Integration, Costs, and 
Benefits.World Educaition News + Reviews. Retrieved from 
http://wenr.wes.org/2017/05/lessons-germanys-refugee-crisis-integration-costs-benefits 
van Alphen, L. M., Dijker, A. J., Bos, A. E., van den Borne, B. H., & Curfs, L. M. (2011). 
Explaining not-in-my-backyard responses to different social groups: The role of group 
characteristics and emotions. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 245-252. 
Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. (2017). Promoting third-party prosocial behaviour: The 
potential of moral emotions. In van Leeuwen, E. & Zagefka, H. (Eds.), Intergroup 
helping (pp. 349-368). Cham: Springer. 
van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity 
model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological 
perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 504–535. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.134.4.504 
van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Bettache, K. (2011). Can moral convictions 
motivate the advantaged to challenge social inequality? Extending the social identity 
model of collective action. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14, 735-753. 
doi:10.1177/1368430210395637 
van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W. (2004). Put your money where 
your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and 
group efficacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 649–664. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.649 
Verkaik, R. (2017). How Germany's open-door refugee policy helps fight terrorism. CNN. 
Retrieved September 6, 2017 from http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/opinions/germany-
open-door-policy-verkaik/index.html 
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      45 
 
 
von der Mark, F. (2016, November 12).  German integration report exposes prejudice against 
immigrants. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/german-integration-
report-exposes-prejudice-against-immigrants/a-36719666 
Wispé, L. (1986). The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a concept, a 
word is needed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 314-321. 
Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F.M. (1990). Responding to membership in a 
disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 58, 994-1003. 
Zick, A., Küpper, B., & Hövermann, A. (2011). Intolerance, prejudice and discrimination - A 
European Report. Berlin, DE: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
  
PITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION      46 
 
 
Table 1 
Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 1 (All scales are 7-
point, except where indicated otherwise) 
 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < 0.05. 
  
     Correlation     
 
Number of 
items 
α/r (in case 
of two items) Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Donation 
intentions 2 .854 3.10 1.80 1 .657** .480** .545** .195** 
2. Collective 
action 
intentions 4 .891 2.49 1.522  1 .544** .528** .311** 
3. Injustice 
awareness 2 .680 3.14 1.88ó   1 .544** .254** 
4. Pity 1 single item  3.02 1.90    1 .412** 
5. Outrage 1 single item  3.46 2.01     1 
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Table 2 
Results of mediation analysis between injustice awareness, outrage and pity, as mediators 
and behavioural intentions (collective action and donation) 
Model 
 
B p 
95%CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95%CI 
Upper 
Bound 
Study 1 Roma people Outrage - CA .03 <.001 .02 .04 
 Outrage - Donation - - - - 
 Pity - CA .12 <.001 .10 .16 
 Pity - Donation .21 <.001 .18 .26 
Study 2a Refugees Outrage - CA - - - - 
 Outrage - Donation - - - - 
 Pity - CA .20 <.001 .12 .28 
 Pity - Donation .33 <.001 .25 .43 
Study 2b Refugees Outrage - CA .02 <.001 .01 .03 
 Outrage - Donation .03 .002 .01 .03 
 Pity - CA .21 <.001 .19 .23 
 Pity - Donation .32 <.001 .30 .34 
Study 3 Gay people Outrage - CA .19 <.001 .16 .21 
 Outrage - Donation .19 <.001 .17 .22 
 Pity - CA .11 <.001 .10 .13 
 Pity - Donation - - - - 
Study 4 Economically 
and politically 
disadvantaged* 
Outrage - CA .15 .012 .05 .22 
 Outrage - Donation - - - - 
 Pity - CA .22 .014 .13 .32 
 Pity -Donation .36 .007 .25 .50 
Study 4 Politically 
disadvantaged* 
Outrage - CA .32 .005 .24 .44 
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Note. *We used the three-item pity measure for the mediation analysis. 
 Outrage - Donation .25 .008 .14 .38 
 Pity - CA .13 .007 .05 .25 
 Pity - Donation .11 .080 -.01 .23 
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Table 3 
Changes of the Chi square, degrees of freedom and model indices by erasing the path between pity and collective action intentions in each model 
Model 
 
χ2 df CFI NFI RMSEA SRMR Δχ2 Δdf p (Δχ2-tests) 
Study 1 Roma people Original 2.62 1 .999 .998 .040 .011 80.17 1 <.001 
 Erased 82.79 2 .953 .952 .200 .052    
Study 2a Refugees Original 2.62 3 1 .995 .000 .041 27.62 1 <.001 
 Erased 30.23 4 .951 .945 .186 .054    
Study 2b Refugees Original .00 0 1  1 .545 .000 714.36 1 <.001 
 Erased 714.36 1 1.957 .957 .356 .055    
Study 3 Gay people Original 3.18 1 .998 .998 .083 .014 4.81 1 .090 
 Erased 7.99 2 .996 .995 .076 .021    
Study 4 Economically 
and politically 
disadvantaged* 
Original 4.82 3 .996 .991 .045 .018 29.8 1 <.001 
 Erased 34.62 4 .939 .933 .159 .075    
Study 4 Politically 
disadvantaged* 
Original 4.56 2 .995 .992 .065 .018 9.54 1 .023 
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Note. * We used the three-item pity measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Erased 14.10 3 .979 .974 .111 .037    
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Table 4 
Scale reliabilities, scale points, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 2a (All scales are 7-point) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < 0.05. 
     Correlation     
 
Number 
of items 
α/r (in case 
of two 
items) M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Donation 
intentions 3 .901 3.30 2.02 1 .738** 
 
.687** .734** -.041 
2. Collective 
action 
intentions 4 .969 3.04 2.32  1 
 
.816** .650** .017 
3. Injustice 
awareness 4 .760 3.76 1.88   1 585** .072 
4. Pity 1 single item  3.98 2.25    1 
-
.231** 
5. Outrage 1 single item  5.03 2.20     1 
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Table 5 
Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 2b (All scales are 7-
point) 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05. 
  
     Correlation     
 
Number 
of items α M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Donation 
intentions 2 .922 2.92 1.67 1 .793** .745** .727** .450** 
2. Collective 
action intentions 4 .757 2.81 1.35  1 .666** .629** .420** 
3. Injustice 
awareness 4 .820 3.29 1.41   1 .636** .521** 
4. Pity 1 single item  3.65 1.84    1 .428** 
5. Outrage 1 single item  3.79 1.95     1 
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Table 6 
Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 3 (All scales are 7-
point) 
 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05. 
     Correlation     
 
Number 
of items α/r M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Donation 
intentions 2 .846 3.26 1.73 1 .803** .594** .341** .535** 
2. Collective 
action 
intentions 4 .757 3.91 1.83  1 .776** .423** .654** 
3. Injustice 
awareness 4 .949 4.90 1.51   1 .401** .674** 
4. Pity 1 
single 
item  3.60 1.78    1 .449** 
5. Outrage 1 
single 
item  3.82 1.82     1 
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Table 7  
Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations of all variables in Study 4 (All scales are 7-point) 
        Correlation           
  
Number 
of items 
α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Attributed collective 
action intentions 
5 .862 4.99 1.13 1 .589** .397** .176** .283** .181** .144* 
2. Attributed donation 
intentions 
3 .808 4.77 1.16 
 
1 .249** .439** .211** .177** .155** 
3. Collection action 
intentions 
5 .821 4.63 1.16 
 
 
1 .561** .347** .496** .542** 
4. Donation intentions 3 .798 4.65 1.29  
  
1 .226** .457** .405** 
5. Injustice awareness 4 .742 6.07 0.86  
   
1 .489** .473** 
6. Pity 3 .801 5.29 1.12  
    
1 .656** 
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7. Outrage 3 .905 4.66 1.47            1 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05. 
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Table 8 
Results of the two-way ANOVA testing the effects of disadvantage type (economic and 
political vs. political) and emotion (pity vs. outrage) on behavioural intentions 
 
Collective action intentions (N = 469) 
 
 
 
Donation intentions (N = 469) 
 
 F df p 
Partial Eta 
squared 
Economic and political - 
Political  
.026 1 .871 .000 
Pity - Outrage 11.85 1 .001 .025 
Interaction .69 1 .407 .001 
 F df p 
Partial Eta 
squared 
Economic and political - 
Political  
8.57 1 .004 .018 
Pity - Outrage 8.10 1 .005 .017 
Interaction .57 1 .450 .001 
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Table 9 
Planned comparisons between emotions on collective action intentions 
  
Economic and political  
(n = 224) 
Independent samples T-test 
 
 
M SD t df p 
Cohen’s
d 
Pity 4.85 1.15 -1.81 302 .074 .22 
Outrage 5.12 1.25        
       
  
Political  
(n = 245) 
Independent samples T-test 
 
 
M SD t df p 
Cohen’s
d 
Pity 4.78 1.21 -3.11 243 .002 .39 
Outrage 5.22 1.04     
 
 
